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ARTICLES
ARE TWO CLAUSES REALLY BETTER THAN
ONE? RETHINKING THE RELIGION CLAUSE(S)
Donald L. Beschle*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The First Amendment begins with two references to the relationship between
government and religion.1 The prohibition on establishment of religion and the
guarantee of free exercise of religion, despite their obvious interaction, are generally
regarded as separate clauses, and analyzed under tests developed under one or the
other.2 The current state of Establishment Clause doctrine and Free Exercise doctrine
is sharply contested and by no means clear.
Supreme Court justices will usually classify a religious freedom case as either
presenting non-establishment or free exercise issues. Having done so, they will apply
the test framed for that clause. But does that lead to the best and most defensible
outcome? Might it be better to recognize that what we regard as separate clauses are,
rather obviously, two aspects of a single right of religious freedom, and apply a single
test that explicitly considers both values?
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the closest analog in the
Canadian Constitution to the American Bill of Rights, makes no reference to a non-

*

Professor, The John Marshall Law School.

1

U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion or the free
exercise thereof[.]”).

2

See infra notes 101–18 and accompanying text.

ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2018.592
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu
1

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW
PAGE | 2 | VOL. 80 | 2018

establishment principle.3 Yet, in their application of the right to religious freedom,
Canadian Courts have shown a sensitivity to non-establishment values that seems to
equal, and occasionally exceed, that of the Supreme Court of the United States.4 This
Article will explore the possibility that abandoning the notion that a religious
freedom case is either an Establishment Clause or a Free Exercise case; instead they
are often, if not always, both, and applying a single test, might lead to better
outcomes.
Part I will explore the recent Supreme Court case of Trinity Lutheran v. Comer5
and the way many justices insist on privileging one clause over the other, even to the
extent of dismissing the other as insignificant in the case. Part II will examine the
Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Town of Greece6 and contrast it with the
contemporaneous Supreme Court of Canada decision in City of Sanguenay.7 Each
case presented a similar question of the permissibility of local government bodies
opening their sessions with public prayer. The cases reach sharply different
conclusions, with Canada weighing non-establishment values more strongly without
an express Establishment Clause than the Supreme Court of the United States. Part
III will give a very brief history of how each constitutional system developed its own
approach to the relationship between government and religion. Finally, Part IV will
suggest a single test for religious freedom cases, whether they initially seem to
invoke one or both currently separate clauses. This test will largely track the
proportionality test used by Canadian (and other western) courts in individual rights
cases.

II. TRINITY LUTHERAN: FREE EXERCISE OR NONESTABLISHMENT?
On June 26, 2017, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Trinity
Lutheran Church v. Comer.8 The case, the most recent attempt by the Supreme Court
to wrestle with the First Amendment Religion Clauses, grew out of a rather humble
set of circumstances. Missouri’s Department of Natural Resources offers a limited

3

The Constitution Act, 1982, c. 11, sch. B (U.K.).

4

See infra notes 101–18 and accompanying text.

5

Trinity Lutheran Church, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017).

6

Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014).

7

Mouvement Laïque Québécois v. Saguenay, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 3 (Can.).

8

Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2012.
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number of financial grants to nonprofit organizations to cover the expense of
resurfacing playgrounds using a surface made from recycled tires, thought to be safer
than gravel or comparable surfaces.9
Trinity Lutheran operates a daycare center for preschool children ages two to
five, on church property.10 The Center admits children of any religion.11 The
Church’s application for a grant under the recycled tire program scored quite high
on several criteria unrelated to the religious nature of the Church, but Missouri
denied the application based on a provision of the Missouri State Constitution.12
That provision, Article I, Section 7, is one of a number of state constitutional
provisions, dating to the late nineteenth century13 that are more specific than the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment in their prohibition of financial
support from government to religious bodies:
That no money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or indirectly,
in aid of any church, sect or denomination of religion, or in aid of any priest,
preacher, minister or teacher thereof, as such; and that no preference shall be given
to nor any discrimination made against any church, sect or creed of religion, or
any favor of religious faith or worship.14

The Missouri provision, and those like it in other states, were a reaction to
intense controversy in many states during the mid and late nineteenth century over
the role of religion in schools, public and private.15 In a legal world that had not yet
incorporated the First Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause, states were free to consider their own responses to two questions: what role,
if any, should religion play in public education, and what role, if any, should
government play in support of religious alternatives to public education?

9

Id. at 2018.

10

Id. at 2017.

11

Id.

12

Id. at 2018; MO. CONST. art. 1, § 7.

13
See STEVEN K. GREEN, THE SECOND DISESTABLISHMENT: CHURCH AND STATE IN THE NINETEENTHCENTURY AMERICA 290–311 (2010), for a discussion of these “Blaine Amendments.”
14

Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2018; MO. CONST. art. 1, § 7.

15

See GREEN, supra note 13.
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Congressman James Blaine, hoping to become the Republican nominee for
president in 1876, introduced a proposed amendment to the U.S. Constitution that
would address these questions.16 The Blaine Amendment would clearly prohibit
states from giving financial aid to religious schools, and would also require states to
provide a system of public schools for all children.17 Blaine seemed to lose interest
in his proposal after he lost the nomination to Rutherford Hayes, and it never
emerged from Congress.18 A large number of states, however, including Missouri,
enacted “Baby Blaine” amendments to their own constitutions, prohibiting state aid
to religious schools in strong and specific language.19
In Locke v. Davey, the Supreme Court seemed to recognize the power of state
constitutional provisions advancing non-establishment principles to a degree beyond
the limits of the First Amendment Establishment Clause.20 Washington, for example,
administered a program of scholarship grants to high school graduates who met
certain academic standards for use at public or private collages.21 This program,
would not, however, help fund a college-level program of study that prepared a
student for ministry.22 Davey, an otherwise qualified student, was denied a grant due
to his desire to use it to help pay for such a program.23 He brought suit claiming this
constituted discrimination in violation of his free exercise rights.24 A divided Court
rejected his claim.25 The Court held there was some “play in the joints” of
establishment and free exercise principles allowing states to pursue nonestablishment values in somewhat stronger terms than required by the First
Amendment.26

16

Id. at 299.

17

Id. at 294–95.

18

Id. at 296–301.

19

Id. at 302.

20

Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 725 (2004).

21

Id. at 716.

22

Id.

23

Id. at 717–18.

24

Id.

25

Id. at 718.

26

Id. at 719.
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Missouri relied on Locke in defending its exclusion of Trinity Lutheran from
the scrap tire program.27 The Court rejected the state’s argument, however, in an
opinion that left Locke itself, and the principle that states might weigh nonestablishment principles more strongly than the Court would weigh such values
under the Establishment Clause, in doubt. The majority opinion, noting that both
sides agreed that under existing precedent, including Trinity Lutheran in the program
would not violate the First Amendment Establishment Clause, went on to view the
case as presenting a Free Exercise Clause claim.28 Drawing on Employment Division
v. Smith29 and City Hialeah v. Church of Lukumi,30 setting forth the parameters of
the Free Exercise Clause, the Court found Missouri had engaged in unconstitutional
discrimination against Trinity Lutheran.31
Is Locke still good law? Perhaps; the majority opinion did distinguish Locke as
involving a program that did not distinguish on the grounds of who the recipient was,
but rather on what the specific funds were to be used for.32 It also dropped a short
footnote, which was disavowed by two concurring Justices,33 pointing out that the
holding was limited to the specific facts of the case.34 Four Justices, two concurring
and two dissenting, would view the case as being, at least potentially, far more than
a simple, fact-based decision about playground surfaces.35
To dissenting Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsberg, the Court’s
decision was a serious blow to the principles behind the Establishment Clause.36

27

Trinity Lutheran Church, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2016 (2017).

28

Id. at 2019.

29
Employment Division v. Smith, 484 U.S. 873 (1990) (the free exercise clause does not mandate
exemption from generally applicable criminal statutes).
30
Church of Lukumi Babalue Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (the free exercise clause
invalidates a statute specifically targeted at religious beliefs).
31

Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2020–21.

32

Id. at 2023.

33

See id. at 2025 (Thomas, J., concurring).

34

Id. at 2024 n.3 (majority opinion).

35
Justices Thomas and Gorsuch concur but would prefer a strong statement of free exercise protection
against discrimination. Id. at 2025–26 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice
Ginsburg, dissented, finding that this is an Establishment Clause violation. Id. at 2028 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
36

Id. at 2027 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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While earlier cases had permitted forms of indirect state aid to religious schools or
other church-related programs, this was “the first time. . . [the Court held] that the
Constitution requires the government to provide public funds directly to the
church.”37 Justice Sotomayor chided the majority for simply accepting the parties’
agreement that the First Amendment Establishment Clause was not at issue here,
reminding her colleagues that the Court, not the parties, decide what issues are
relevant.38 In the dissenters’ view, the case was primarily about non-establishment
values, and a serious erosion of those values.39
In sharp contrast, the concurring opinions of Justice Thomas and Justice
Gorsuch would prefer a stronger statement in favor of the Church’s free exercise
rights and dismissing any establishment concerns.40 In particular, they specifically
took issue with the majority’s short footnote stressing the narrow scope of the Court’s
holding.41
Finally, Justice Breyer, in a short concurring opinion, stressed the general
public benefits of the scrap tire program, and added his own assertion that the case
should be limited to its facts, leaving “the application of the Free Exercise Clause to
other public benefits for another day.”42 While joining the majority’s Free Exercise
analysis, he specifically analogizes this case to Everson v. Board of Education,43 the
seminal Establishment Clause case. Justice Breyer, perhaps the present Court’s most
frequent balancer,44 is clearly aware of the significance of each clause, and unwilling
to give one automatic preference over the other.
Trinity Lutheran, like Locke, presents a situation where the co-existence of free
exercise and Establishment Clause values is obvious. But the history of Religion
Clause jurisprudence is dominated by cases placed, by the Court and commentators,

37

Id.

38

Id. at 2028 (“Constitutional questions are decided by this Court, not the parties’ concessions.”).

39

Id. at 2027.

40

Id. at 2025–26 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).

41

Id.

42

Id. at 2027 (Breyer, J., concurring).

43

Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).

44
To clarify Justice Breyer’s fact-specific balancing, contrast McCreary v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005),
where he provides the fifth vote to invalidate a Ten Commandments display in a county courthouse, with
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005), where he provides the fifth vote to permit a Ten Commandments
monument to remain on the grounds of the Texas State Capital.
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within the purview of one or the other clause. Are the values sought to be protected
by each clause really independent of each other, or are they always both present,
whether acknowledged or not? How important is the presence of both clauses?
Would it make a difference if there were no Establishment Clause? And what might
that difference be? A pair of recent cases involving prayer at local legislative
meetings, one case from the U.S. Supreme Court, the other from the Supreme Court
of Canada, present an interesting contrast.

III. LOCAL LEGISLATIVE PRAYER IN THE U.S. AND CANADA
TOWN OF GREECE AND CITY OF SANGUENAY
Within about a year, the U.S. Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Canada
each considered the constitutionality of prayer at meetings of local legislative bodies.
The U.S. case, Town of Greece, was analyzed under the First Amendment
Establishment Clause.45 The Canadian case, City of Sanguenay, was analyzed under
the Canadian and Quebec Charter of Rights and Freedoms provisions protecting
freedom of religion and conscience.46 Neither of the Canadian documents has an
express equivalent of the First Amendment Establishment Clause. Perhaps, then, the
fact that cases came to different conclusions about local legislative prayer would not
be surprising; but perhaps the way in which the courts disagreed might be.

A.

Town of Greece v. Galloway

The town board of Greece, New York held a monthly meeting to conduct
business.47 Citizens could attend and address the members.48 Until 1999, the board
opened its meetings with a moment of silence.49 The newly-elected board supervisor,
in 1999, decided to begin meetings with a recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance and
a prayer delivered by a local clergyman designated “chaplain of the month.”50 From
1999 to 2007, every invited chaplain was Christian, and prayers ranged from generic
theistic themes to specific Christian references.51 Two local citizens brought suit,

45

Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014).

46
Mouvement Laïque Québécois v. Saguenay, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 3 (Can.); The Constitution Act, 1982, c.
11, sch. B (U.K.).
47

Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1816.

48

Id.

49

Id.

50

Id.

51

Id.
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claiming the practice of prayer violated the First Amendment Establishment Clause;
the plaintiffs did not ask for a complete ban on such prayer, but only that prayer be
limited to “inclusive and ecumenical” prayer.52
As the case progressed, the town invited a Jewish layman and the chairman of
a local Bahai temple to deliver an invocation and granted the application of a Wiccan
priestess to do the same,53 but the overwhelming majority of invocations were
delivered by Christian clergy. The limited outreach seemed to make little difference
to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which invalidated the practice, applying
Justice O’Connor’s “non-endorsement” approach to Establishment Clause cases,54
and finding that a “steady drumbeat of Christian prayer” clearly sent a message of
government endorsement of Christianity.55
The Court, in a majority opinion by Justice Kennedy, reversed, largely on the
basis of Marsh v. Chambers, the 1983 case permitting the Nebraska legislature’s
practice of having a chaplain open sessions with an invocation.56 Marsh itself relied
not on any previously-articulated Establishment Clause test, but rather on the
longstanding nature of the practice of legislative invocations, dating back to the First
Congress.57 Justice Kennedy, again relying on Marsh and history, rejected the
contention that legislative prayer must be nonsectarian because only a “course or
practice over time” of prayers that “denigrate nonbelievers or religious minorities, or
preach conversion” might be problematic.58
Justice Kagan and her dissenting colleagues did not challenge Marsh itself, but
distinguished it.59 Local town board meetings include ordinary citizens as

52

Id. at 1817.

53

Id.

54
Justice O’Connor puts forward as the key question “whether the government intends to convey a
message of endorsement or disapproval of religion.” Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691 (1984)
(O’Connor, J., concurring). Her test has been employed in subsequent cases. See, e.g., County of
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
55

Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1818.

56

Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).

57

Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1818–19 (citing Marsh, 463 U.S. at 791–92).

58

Id. at 1823.

59

Id. at 1842 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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participants as well as observers.60 The board itself, in dealing with citizen petitions
and requests, is acting much as a court would act; surely a court session could not
begin with sectarian prayer without making nonbelievers feel alienated from their
government.61 Thus, argued the dissent, local legislative prayer should be
permissible not only where representatives of non-majority faiths have access to the
“chaplain” role, but also where the prayers themselves are nonsectarian and
inclusive.62

B.

Movement Laique Québécois v. Saguenay (City)

Only months after the U.S. Supreme Court decided Town of Greece, the
Supreme Court of Canada considered a challenge to prayer at meetings of a local
legislative council.63 At the start of each public meeting of the Saguenay City
Council, the mayor would deliver a prayer.64 The short body of the prayer made no
specific sectarian references, but the prayer began with the words (in French) “[i]n
the name of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit,” as the mayor made the sign of
the cross.65 An atheist resident of Sanguenay requested the mayor cease the practice,
but the mayor refused.66 The resident complained to the Quebec Human Rights
Tribunal, which held the prayer practice was inconsistent with the Quebec Charter
of Rights, in so far as it interfered with the resident’s freedom of conscience and
religion.67
The case made its way to the Supreme Court of Canada, which, in sharp
contrast to the U.S. Supreme Court in Town of Greece, unanimously held that the
prayer practice, by “consciously adhering to certain religious beliefs to the exclusion
of others,” violated “the state’s duty of neutrality” in derogation of the freedom of
conscience and religion provisions of the Quebec Charter and the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedom.68 In contrast to the U.S. Constitution, neither the Quebec nor

60

Id. at 1844–45.

61

Id.

62

Id. at 1850.

63

Mouvement Laïque Québécois v. Saguenay, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 3 (Can.).

64

Id. ¶¶ 1–4.

65

Id.

66

Id.

67

Id. ¶¶ 14–17.

68

Id. ¶ 4.
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the Canadian Charters contain an express provision calling for government neutrality
on religious matters analogous to the First Amendment Establishment Clause.
However, Justice Gascon, writing for the Canadian Court, held that such a duty
“results from an evolving interpretation of freedom of conscience and religion,”
which “requires that the state neither favour nor hinder any particular belief, and the
same holds true for non-belief.”69
The mayor and council members argued the prayers were protected as
furthering their own rights of religious expression.70 But Justice Gascon responded,
“[w]hen the state adheres to a belief, it is not merely expressing an opinion on the
subject. It is creating a hierarchy of beliefs and casting doubts on the values of those
it does not share.”71 And encouragement or discouragement of religion violates
Charter principles regardless of whether the practice is done “under the guise of
cultural or historical reality or heritage.”72
Sanguenay pointed to the practice of the Canadian House of Commons in
opening its sessions with a prayer.73 But unlike the U.S. Supreme Court in Town of
Greece, the Canadian court found a substantial difference between the national
legislative body and local councils. In language reminiscent of Justice Kagan’s Town
of Greece dissent, Justice Gascon noted that at the local level, citizens are at least
potential, if not actual, participants, which makes the messages of non-inclusion sent
by the legislative body more significant.74
Town of Greece and City of Saguenay presented remarkably similar factual
situations to their respective courts. That different national high courts would reach
sharply different conclusions is not, by itself, surprising. The contrast here stands out
when we note that the constitutional documents suggest disagreement in the opposite
direction.75 How is it that the principle of non-establishment would receive stronger
protection under the document that does not single out establishment as a particular
concern? And these cases are not unique. Over the last three decades, Canadian

69

Id. ¶¶ 14–17.

70

Id. ¶ 73.

71

Id.

72

Id. ¶ 78.

73

Id. ¶¶ 141–43.

74

See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1844–45 (2014) (Kagan, J., dissenting).

75

The Constitution Act, 1982, c. 11, § 2, sch. B (U.K.); cf. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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courts have enforced the non-establishment principle at least as strongly the U.S.
Supreme Court cases.76
How much does the constitutional text matter here? How might the text be
molded by history or culture? Can the text (and even the punctuation) lead us down
the wrong interpretive road? We might benefit from a brief look at the similarities
and differences between United States and Canadian approaches to the proper
interaction between religion and government.

IV. ESTABLISHMENT AND NON-ESTABLISHMENT IN TWO
NATIONS: SOME BACKGROUND
A brief discussion of the origins of the respective religion provisions of the
First Amendment and of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms will help to
inform one’s understanding of the provisions themselves.

A.

Non-Establishment in the United States: A New Thing?

The principle that the U.S. Constitution calls for a separation of church and
state, whatever the definition of separation might be, is so commonly acknowledged
it is easy to overlook the degree to which that was a relatively new idea in the
eighteenth century, and the degree to which the extent of separation was contested
well into the twentieth century. European nations in the eighteenth century regarded
it as a truism that a nation would benefit from, if not require, a nationally-recognized
religion as a bulwark of national unity.77 The degree to which dissenters would be
tolerated might vary, but the basic principle remained. Incorporating the nonestablishment principle into a constitutional document was, at best, a highly unusual
thing.78 The Vatican must have been quite surprised when its request to the
Washington administration for advice on the appointment of an American bishop
was rejected with the explanation that the new government had no role in religious
matters.79 It is hardly surprising, then, such a new idea would need explicit

76

See infra notes 139–56 and accompanying text.

77
See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 422 (1651) (writing approvingly of the proposition that “in every
Christian Common-wealth, the Civil Sovereign is the Supreme Pastor . . . it is by his authority that all
other Pastors are made, and have power to teach”).
78
See, e.g., GREEN, supra note 13, at 24–31 (discussing the variations in the establishments in the
American colonies during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries).
79
In 1789, the papal nuncio in Paris consulted Benjamin Franklin regarding the new government’s views
on an acceptable appointment of an American bishop. Franklin responded that the United States
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recognition in the Constitution. But to state a principle, especially a new one, is not
to define it, or even to justify it.
The second important point to remember is that the First Amendment, and the
balance of the Bill of Rights, was a limitation only on the federal government until
the enactment of the Civil War Amendments.80 The incorporation of the guarantee
into the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition on denial of due process by the states
occurred later.81 Federal jurisdiction over territorial law would lead to the late
nineteenth century Mormon polygamy cases that would have a lasting impact on the
Free Exercise clause.82 There was no significant Supreme Court case dealing with
the Establishment Clause until the mid-twentieth century.83
With the First Amendment prohibitions binding only the national government,
even states such as Massachusetts and Connecticut, that maintained singledenomination established churches,84 could agree with the Establishment Clause. If
anything, it assured them no national church would displace their own statesupported denomination. But early in the nineteenth century, states began to move
in the direction of general non-establishment. The 1820s saw the end of the singledenomination establishments in Connecticut and Massachusetts.85 No state admitted
after the original thirteen maintained such an establishment; to the contrary, state
constitutions began to incorporate non-establishment provisions.86 Still, the scope of
such provisions would need to be fleshed out.
The earliest non-establishment issues at the state level involved statesubsidized financial support for clergy.87 But with those issues fading into the
background, or being decisively resolved against such support, nineteenth-century

government would take no role in such an appointment. See JAMES HENNESSEY, AMERICAN CATHOLICS:
A HISTORY OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC COMMUNITY IN THE UNITED STATES (1981).
80

See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833); see also Permoli v. New Orleans, 44 U.S. 589 (1845).

81

See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).

82

See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); Davis v. Benson, 133 U.S. 333 (1890).

83

Everson v. Bd. of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).

84

See GREEN, supra note 13, at 118–45.

85

Id.

86
Id. at 144 (“Formal establishments by the early antebellum era were already anachronisms.”). See id. at
145, for a discussion of the end of the final formal establishments.
87

Id.
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non-establishment debate focused overwhelmingly on schools.88 Foreshadowing
twentieth-century First Amendment cases, states wrestled with the presence of
religion in public schools, and the legitimacy of state financial aid to religious
schools.89 This was likely inevitable in light of two important developments in the
early to mid-century: the rise of the public school, that is, basic schooling provided
by the state and open to all children, and the first great waves of immigration, most
prominently in the same era, by Catholic Irish newcomers.90 Whether a consequence
of actual theological differences, a reaction to the Vatican’s rejection of the principle
of separation of church and state, or simple ethnic prejudice, the presence of Irish
Catholics in large numbers would trigger significant conflict, largely political, and
occasionally violent.91
Irish immigration coincided with the emergence and swift growth of the public
“common” school, largely the work of Horace Mann.92 Education had been the
province of private entities, often associated with religious institutions, and
sometimes benefiting from public financial support.93 It was a nearly universal belief
that some form of religious instruction would be a part of basic education.94 While
religious institutions provided basic education, this created no particular problem.
But if all children were to be gathered together in a publicly-operated school, how
would religion be incorporated, if at all?
The new public schools widely adopted Bible reading and other religious
practices Catholic leaders saw as explicitly Protestant.95 This led to demands that
these practices be ended, or that public funds be made available to Catholic schools,
which took root and grew as the century progressed.96 Funding for Catholic or other
religious private schools was rejected, with many states enacting the specific
language of “Baby Blaine” amendments, similar to the amendment that had died in

88

Id. at 251–325.

89

Id.

90

See generally id. at 253–71.

91

Id. at 266–71.

92

Id. at 251–66.

93
Id. at 252 (“At the beginning of the century, public education was unapologetically religious in
orientation.”).
94

Id. at 253–54.

95

Id. at 266–71.

96

See generally id. at 271–87.

ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2018.592
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW
PAGE | 14 | VOL. 80 | 2018

Congress.97 With respect to religion in public schools, the most common early
response was that as long as the Bible and other religious references were
“nonsectarian,” thought of as sort of a least common denominator Protestantism, no
one could validly object.98 Toward the end of the century, however, school districts
began to take objections to the “nonsectarian” position seriously, and moved toward
secularizing public schools.99 But prayer and Bible reading would persist in many
districts until the Supreme Court would find, in the 1960s, that these practices
violated the Establishment Clause.100
Issues involving government aid to religious schools and the presence of prayer
and Bible reading in public schools were central to the emergence of the Supreme
Court Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Early 1960s cases finding that public
school prayer101 or devotional Bible reading102 violated the First Amendment gave
birth to a two-part test. Government would violate the Establishment Clause by a
practice that either entirely lacked a secular purpose or had the principal effect of
promoting religion.103 The 1971 case of Lemon v. Kurtzman, shifting the focus to
state aid to religious schools, adopted these two questions and added a third.104 A
government practice leading to “excessive entanglement” between churches and
government would also violate the Clause.105
Strict application of the Lemon test led to successful Establishment Clause
challenges in the ensuing decades, but the test had its detractors. By the 1980s, the
Court was finding more acceptable instances of state support for religion, both
financial and symbolic, either by refining or rejecting Lemon.106 Led by Justice

97

See supra note 13 and accompanying text.

98

See generally GREEN, supra note 13, at 253–66.

99

Id. at 289–325.

100

Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).

101

Engle, 370 U.S. at 421.

102

Schempp, 374 U.S. at 203.

103

Id. at 222.

104

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).

105

Id. at 612–14.

106

See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (holding that “indirect” aid to religious schools is
constitutional); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (holding that a nativity scene as a component of
a government-sponsored Christmas holiday display is constitutional).

ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2018.592
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu

ARE TWO CLAUSES REALLY BETTER THAN ONE?
PAGE | 15

Scalia, one group of Justices would hold that an Establishment Clause violation, at
least in contexts outside of direct governmental financial support, would be found
only where government coerced dissenters to conform to religious beliefs through
concrete punishment.107 A second group, led by Justice O’Connor, found that the
central question to be asked in applying Lemon was whether the government practice
sent a message of endorsement of religious belief and suggested that dissenters were
disfavored members of the community.108 While Justices regarded as strict
separationists have not disappeared, recent cases such as Trinity Lutheran and Town
of Greece show that enforcement of the Establishment Clause has clearly eroded in
recent decades.
As the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence developed, the Free
Exercise Clause led to a separate line of analysis. Prior to the 1960s, religious
believers had been successful in a number of free speech cases,109 but the Supreme
Court had never affirmed a strong Free Exercise right to a religiously-based
exemption from a generally applicable statute that pursued a secular legislative goal.
In 1963, the Court declared that an unemployment compensation applicant who
was denied benefits was entitled to have her religiously-motivated refusal to accept
Saturday work recognized as a Free Exercise-based exemption.110 The Court held
that an exemption claim based on a statute’s substantial interference with religious
duty required the state to justify denial of the exemption under the strict scrutiny
standard.111
But the 1970s and 1980s saw the Free Exercise version of strict scrutiny applied
in a manner that hardly resembled its near per se invalidity standard in other

107

Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 640 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The coercion that was a hallmark
of historical establishments of religion has coercion of religious orthodoxy and financial support by force
of law and threat of penalty.”).

108

Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687–88 (O’Connor, J., concurring).

109

See, e.g., W. Va. Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding that Jehovah’s Witness children
cannot be forced to recite the Pledge of Allegiance); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938)
(invalidating an ordinance prohibiting distribution of literature).
110

Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).

111

Id. at 406–08.

ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2018.592
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW
PAGE | 16 | VOL. 80 | 2018

contexts.112 In Smith, a sharply-divided Court,113 declared that despite the 1963 case
to the contrary, the Free Exercise Clause had never been and should not be
recognized as demanding strict scrutiny in a case seeking an exemption from a
generally applicable statutory duty.114 Only a government statute or practice that
singled out believers due to hostility to their beliefs rather than the secular
consequences of their actions, would call for application of anything more than a
rational basis justification.115
While Smith seemed to not only significantly reduce the scope of the Free
Exercise Clause, but also to clarify the proper standard, subsequent events in the
political branches of both the federal and state levels of government intervened to
make the situation much murkier.116 By statute, Congress created a strict scrutiny
standard for a religiously-based claim of exemption from federal mandates; and a
significant number of states, either by statute or court decision, affirmed strict
scrutiny was the appropriate test when judging a claim to a free exercise exemption
under state constitutional or statutory law.117
So, in recent decades, the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clauses of
the First Amendment have led to the following situation: a once rather rigorous
Establishment Clause has become significantly less restrictive on government
activity that benefits religion. At the level of First Amendment doctrine, Smith has
had a similar narrowing effect on the scope of the Free Exercise Clause. But
subsequent events in Congress, and at the state level, have pushed back, and the
actual scope of free exercise protection may not be much less than that afforded in
pre-Smith times. There seems to be little question that states are free to give greater
free exercise protection than that provided by the First Amendment. But Trinity
Lutheran casts doubt on the extent to which states are also free to expand their

112
See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1983) (holding no exception from military uniform
requirements to permit Orthodox Jewish army psychiatrist to wear a yarmulke); Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for
Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (holding no exemption for religious group from state fair
regulation that sale or distribution of literature must be from fixed booths).
113

Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).

114

Id. at 878–79; Justice Scalia maintained that strict scrutiny had never actually been the standard applied
by the Court. Id. at 878–88.
115

Id. at 877–78.

116
See generally Vikram David Amar, State RFRAS and the Workplace, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 513
(1999).
117

Id.
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commitment to non-establishment values.118 Has all of this left us with a legal regime
that underenforces non-establishment values? And might the separate evolution of
the two religion clauses have contributed to this?

B.

Religious Freedom in Canadian Constitutional Law: Some
Background

Canadian law concerning church and state would develop from a starting point
with significant differences from that of the United States. At the time of
Confederation, Canada inherited the British doctrine of parliamentary supremacy,
and it would be many decades before Canadian courts would be asked to invalidate
legislation as interfering with religious freedom.119 And neither the British nor
French legacy would lead Canadians to regard government recognition and
assistance to religion as unusual or very troubling.
If the North-South divide was the source of greatest tension in the forging of
the U.S. Constitution, the British-French divide was the greatest threat to Canadian
unity in the nineteenth century and continued to be a source of conflict thereafter.120
In recent decades, the conflict has focused on language rights, but prior to the 1960s,
the British-French divide was played out on religious grounds, as a ProtestantCatholic conflict.121
As the unrest that would engulf the American colonies in Revolution
percolated, the British Parliament, in the Quebec Act of 1774, provided that the
inhabitants of Quebec would “have the free Exercise of the Religion of the Church
of Rome, subject to the king’s supremacy,” a concession credited with maintaining
Quebec’s loyalty during the American Revolution.122 The 1851 Freedom of Worship
Act sought to protect “the free exercise and enjoyment of Religious Profession and
Worship without discrimination or preference,” but discrimination against Catholics
in pre-Confederation provinces outside Quebec continued.123

118

Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017).

119

See generally JEREMY WEBBER, THE CONSTITUTION OF CANADA: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 60–64
(2015).
120

Id. at 14–20.

121

See generally JANET EPP BUCKINGHAM, FIGHTING OVER GOD: A LEGAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN CANADA 11–19 (2014).
122

Id. at 11–12.

123

Id. at 12.
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The British North America Act of 1867, the document that served as the
original constitution of a united Canada (consisting at the time of Ontario, Quebec,
Nova Scotia and New Brunswick), dealt with the religious issue by dividing national
and provincial powers.124 Each province, for example, was allowed to determine the
acceptable form of marriage, while the nation would maintain a single federal
definition of marriage.125 Of more lasting significance, each province was given
exclusive control over education.126 Prior to 1867, both Quebec and Ontario had
established public schools that included instruction in the dominant provincial
religion, but also provided public support for dissenters to have their own religiouslybased schools (Protestant in Quebec and Catholic in Ontario).127
Article 93 of the 1867 Constitution preserved each province’s right to continue
the system in place at the time of confederation.128 Statutes enacted in later decades
would provide the same powers to provinces that joined the confederation after
1867.129 In short, the constitutional system allowed provinces to choose to maintain
publicly-funded schools for Catholic or Protestant minorities in a province where the
dominant public school system was unacceptable to that group, as long as those
schools were in place at the time the province joined the Confederation. In recent
decades, provinces have moved away from this system of allowing public funds to
confessional schools of Catholic or Protestant faiths (but not other minority
religions), yet the authority of the provinces to provide funding for dissenting
Protestant or Catholic schools remains.130
The tradition of Parliamentary Supremacy meant that until the 1982
constitutional reforms that gave birth to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
religious freedom was entirely a matter for statutory, if any, protection.131 But the
Charter, in Section 2, provides constitutional protection of “freedom of conscience

124

Constitution Act of 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. c. 3 (UK), reprinted in RSC 1985 App. II, No. 5.

125

See BUCKINGHAM, supra note 121, at 156–64.

126

Id. at 35–43.

127

Id. at 35.

128

Id.

129

Id.

130

Id. at 54–59.

131

See WEBBER, supra note 119.
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and religion.”132 This provision, like other Charter rights, is subject “only to such
reasonable limits proscribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society.”133 Thus, Canadian courts have had nearly four decades to
consider claims that government actions violated this Charter right. And these courts
do so in the absence of any express Constitutional provision prohibiting the
establishment of religion. But the absence of such a clause has not meant that
government involvement with religion is unproblematic. In dealing with issues that
American courts would label as Establishment Clause cases, Canadian courts have
demonstrated the extent to which non-establishment values are inherent in freedom
of religion clause.

V. FREE EXERCISE AND NON-ESTABLISHMENT: TWO VALUES
OR ONE?
In the previous section, we saw two nations with somewhat different histories
and legal responses to the issue of religious freedom. In the United States, an early
decision was made to reject the notion of an established church, at least at the
national level.134 This was reflected in the early inclusion of a non-establishment
provision in its Constitution, and the prohibition would be extended decades later to
action by state governments.135 In Canada, certain elements of establishment were
accepted in its original constitutional arrangement, and while current constitutional
language expressly protects religious freedom, there is no express prohibition of
establishment.136 One would logically predict that the United States would take the
non-establishment principle far more seriously than Canada. Yet, since the
enactment of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Canadian courts have seemed to
be at least as diligent in enforcement of the principle as their American counterparts.
In 1985, the Supreme Court of Canada, in Big M Drug Mart,137 struck down a
federal statute requiring businesses to close on Sunday.138 The Court held that the

132

See id. at 191–94.

133

Id. at 186–89.

134

See supra notes 74–85 and accompanying text.

135

Id.

136

See supra notes 119–23 and accompanying text.

137

See generally R. v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (Can.).

138

Lord’s Day Act, R.S.C. 1970, c L-13 (the Act prohibited, with some exceptions, commercial activity
on Sunday), invalidated by Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 S.C.R. at 301–02.
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79-year-old statute had clearly been adopted for the purpose of promoting religious
practice, and that would be sufficient to invalidate it as violative of religious
freedom.139 Government support of religion, then, could violate religious freedom
without the existence of an express non-establishment provision.140 A year later,
however, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld an Ontario Sunday closing law.141
The statute, recently adopted and containing a number of exceptions not present in
the 1906 federal statute, in the Court’s opinion, satisfied the balancing test set forth
in R. v. Oakes.142
Section 1 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides that Charter rights
can be limited by “such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society.”143 In Oakes, the Supreme Court of Canada
set out a proportionality test for the application of Section 1. In short, the test asks
three things of the challenged statute: whether it is rationally related to a legitimate
government objective, whether it impairs the right as little as possible, and whether
the government interest is sufficiently important to justify the degree of interference
with the right.144 Under this test, the Court found the more narrowly-tailored Ontario
statute was justified.145
These cases can be compared to the 1961 U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Braunfeld v. Brown,146 where the Court upheld a Sunday closing statute, accepting
the state’s justification that it had been adopted for the secular purpose of providing
for a common day of rest and the choice of Sunday was merely in recognition of the
preferences of most citizens.147 The decision, which pre-dated the emergence of the
Lemon test or its elements present in the school prayer cases, focused on the claim

139

Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 S.C.R. at 331.

140

Id.

141

R. v. Edwards Books and Arts, Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 (Can.) (upholding the Retail Business Holiday
Act R.S.O. 1980, c. 453).

142

Id. at 768 (citing R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 105–06 (Can.)).

143

The Constitution Act, 1982, c. 11, § 1, sch. B (U.K.).

144

Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. at 139.

145

Edwards Books, [1986] 2 S.C.R. at 741–44.

146

See generally Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).

147

Id. at 607–08.
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of the plaintiff that the mandatory closing law interfered with his rights to the free
exercise of his Jewish beliefs.148
Establishment Clause jurisprudence in the United States was largely formed by
the cases invaliding prayer and devotional Bible reading in public schools, and the
two-part purpose and effect test that would be expanded to the three-part Lemon
test.149 But the absence of an express non-establishment principle in Canada did not
prevent several provincial courts from striking down similar practices in post-Charter
public schools.
As discussed above, the 1867 Constitution included Article 93, which protected
minority religious education insofar as it existed at the time of Confederation (or, by
statute, at the time new provinces joined), but it did not speak to the question of
religion in the majority schools.150 The presence of religion in the public schools,
Protestant in most provinces, Catholic in Quebec, was unchallenged for decades.151
Starting in the 1960s, however, sentiment in several provinces in favor of
secularization of public schools grew, and in the aftermath of the adoption of the
Charter provision guaranteeing freedom of religion, challenges were brought to the
practice of prayer in public schools.152
In Zylberberg v. Sudbury Board of Education,153 the Ontario Court of Appeal
invalidated the mandatory recitation of the Lord’s Prayer in Sudbury public
schools.154 Even if exemptions were allowed for particular students, the Court held,
this infringed the religious freedom of religious minorities.155 The British Columbia
Supreme Court and the Manitoba Court of Appeal would, within a few years of
Zylberberg, rely on similar reasoning to prohibit mandatory religious exercises in
those provinces.156

148

Id. at 608–09.

149

See supra notes 101–05 and accompanying text.

150

See supra notes 127–30 and accompanying text.

151

See generally BUCKINGHAM, supra note 121, at 35–51.

152

Id. at 51–61.

153

Zylberberg v. Sudbury Bd. of Educ., [1988] 65 O.R. (2d) 641 (Can. Ont. C.A.).

154

Id. at 662–63.

155

Id. at 663.

156

See BUCKINGHAM, supra note 121, at 57–58.
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These cases, along with City of Saguenay, discussed supra, show that an
express non-establishment provision within a constitution is not necessary for a court
to recognize and enforce the values underlying non-establishment principles.157
Canadian courts, under the banner of freedom of religion, have come to conclusions
in cases that would be recognized as Establishment Clause cases in the United States
that are similar, and in some cases, more diligent in their protection of nonestablishment principles.158 A separate Establishment Clause might, in a subtle way,
be not only unnecessary to protect non-establishment values, but might actually
hinder the enforcement of these values, by masking their connection to free exercise.

VI. A SINGLE PROPORTIONALITY TEST FOR THE RELIGION
CLAUSES?
In an eighteenth-century world where government favoritism toward a
particular religion was common, the framers of the First Amendment would see the
need for specific non-establishment language. Standing alone, a free exercise
guarantee might promise no more than mere tolerance of dissenters. Even today, and
even in Western democracies, the demand that government be absolutely neutral in
religious matters is not universal. Post-World War II international covenants on
human rights typically protect freedom of religion and conscience, but do not contain
provisions prohibiting government support of favored religions.159 National
constitutions range from those proclaiming the nation to be secular, to those
recognizing a special place in the history and culture of the nation for one religion,
to those maintaining, at least symbolically, a national church.160
The Canadian cases illustrate that the absence of an explicit non-establishment
provision does not preclude courts from recognizing non-establishment principles as
inherent in a guarantee of religious freedom. The question, of course, will not be

157
See S.L. v. Commission Scholaire des Chemes, 2012 SCC 7, 2012 1 S.C.R. 235. Justice Deschamps
notes “Religious neutrality is now seen by many western states as a legitimate means of creating a free
state in which citizens of various beliefs can exercise their individual rights.” Id. ¶ 10. She illustrates the
connection between neutrality and religious freedom in cases beginning with Big M Drug Mart. Id.
¶¶ 121–25.
158

Id.

159

See generally Natan Lerner, Religious Human Rights Under the United Nations, in 3 RELIGIOUS
HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 79–84 (Johan D. van der Vyver & John Witte eds., 1996).
160

Compare, e.g., Constitution of Ireland 1937 art. 44, http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/cons/en/html
(declaring the separation of church and state), with 1975 SYNTAGMA [SYN.] [CONSTITUTION] 3 (Greece)
(establishing the Eastern Orthodox Church).
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whether respect for the principle is present or absent, but rather how strongly it
weighs in the balance. One might assume the presence of a non-establishment
provision would ensure the most rigorous enforcement of the principle. Yet the level
of Establishment Clause enforcement in the United States has noticeably declined.161
However counterintuitive it might seem, could the impulse to regard nonestablishment and free exercise as separate principles, even though related, be in part
responsible for underenforcement?
The treatment of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses as separate
things has led to the development of separate analytical tests for each. And within
each clause, debate continues about the proper test. Establishment Clause cases pit
advocates of non-coercion, non-endorsement, and strict Lemon separation against
each other.162 Free Exercise cases see advocates of strict scrutiny contend with
supporters of only minimal scrutiny in most cases.163 And all of this usually means
that when confronted with a church-state case, the first thing one is led to do is to
choose which box to place it in: Free Exercise or Establishment?
Of course, separate analytical tracks have not prevented judges from
recognizing connections. In United States v. Welsh, a statutory interpretation rather
than a constitutional case,164 Justice Harlan concurred in an opinion defining the term
“religious” in a statute allowing conscientious objectors to avoid the military draft in
an extremely broad way, because he thought a narrow, traditional definition would
cause some Establishment Clause problems.165 And the Establishment Clause cases
dealing with school prayer are argued with the impact on the students’ own religious
rights obvious in the background.166 Nevertheless, the choice of how to classify a
case, and what test follows from that decision, can skew the process. The
Establishment Clause tests focus on whether government has overstepped its bounds

161

See supra notes 106–08 and accompanying text.

162

Id.

163

See supra notes 106–16 and accompanying text.

164

Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1979).

165

Id. at 356–61 (Harlan, J., concurring).

166
See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962) (“The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise
Clause, does not depend on any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the
enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce
nonobservant individuals or not.”).
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but pushes the harm to the religious freedom of dissenters into the background.167
Conversely, the Free Exercise Clause bring the individual into the foreground but
pushes the duty of government to maintain neutrality on religious questions into the
background.168
If the separate analytical approaches to cases labelled as either Establishment
Clause or Free Exercise Clause cases can lead to less than optimal outcomes, what
can be done to improve the situation? If both clauses were rethought as simply
aspects of a single clause protecting freedom of religion, what alternative analytical
framework might be appropriate? The Canadian approach offers a possible
answer.169
The Oakes test for balancing Charter rights claims under the Section 1
provision asks when the limitation of the right is consistent with “reasonable
limits . . . demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”170 The Oakes test
is a version of the “proportionality” test adopted by a number of Western
democracies to consider limitations of recognized individual rights.171 While subtle
differences exist in the application of this proportionality test among nations that
adhere to it, the basic steps are the same. And while the U.S. Supreme Court has
largely resisted the use of proportionality in individual rights cases, an examination
of the test will show it brings together a number of analytical steps quite familiar to
American lawyers.
The initial step will be to determine whether there is a plausible claim of a rights
violation at the outset, before any type of balancing or enunciation of the state’s
interest is considered.172 Here, Canadian courts tend to be generous, ruling out only

167

See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2031 (2017) (Sotomayor,
J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority opinion for focusing only on the Church’s Free Exercise claim to
the exclusion of the question of whether including the Church in the program would violate the
Establishment Clause).

168

See id.

169

The Constitution Act, 1982, c. 11, § 1, sch. B (U.K.).

170

See generally AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THEIR
LIMITATIONS (2012).
171

See, e.g., Irwin Toy, Ltd. v. Quebec, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, at 967–71 (analyzing the Oakes test).

172

The right of free speech has been broadly defined. See, e.g., Irwin Toy, 1 S.C.R at 969 (“if the activity
conveys or attempts to convey a meaning, it has expressive content and prima facie falls within the scope
of the guarantee”).
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claims that are almost indisputably outside Charter protection.173 Since this is merely
a threshold question, not clearly leading to strong or weak protection, the
consequences of clarifying a belief system as “religion” or not becomes less crucial.
Of course, Canadian Charter language speaking in terms of religion and conscience
lends itself to broad interpretation, but the absence of the term “conscience” from the
First Amendment does not by any means limit American courts to a narrow definition
of the belief systems protected.174 In a system recognizing a single freedom of
religion right, the plausible violation here may be twofold.175 The government action
may have implications for both non-establishment and free exercise values, and both
may be necessary to consider regardless of the particular objections to government
activity put forward by the particular plaintiff.176
The next step in proportionality analysis is to identify the government interest
in the action that is challenged.177 The Oakes court held that the interest must be
“pressing and substantial,” and while this certainly sounds like a level of heightened,
if not strict, scrutiny, courts can be reluctant to end the analysis here if the
government interest is not clearly illegitimate or trivial.178 The strength or weakness
of the government interest will return as a factor in the final step of analysis.
With the state interest in its regulation established, the next step is to ask
whether there is a rational connection between the regulation and the objective.179
Similar to the rational basis test in American constitutional law, this part of the test
will usually be satisfied and will exclude only actions entirely unrelated to legitimate
government goals.180 In the context of religious freedom, it would end the inquiry in
favor of the rights claimant only where the legitimate interest put forward by the state
seems entirely pretextual, and invoked to justify either naked hostility or favoritism
to religion.181

173

The Constitution Act, 1982, c. 11, § 2, sch. B (U.K.).

174

See generally BARAK, supra note 170, at 245–302.

175

Id.

176

Id.

177

See Irwin Toy, [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 971–72.

178

See generally BARAK, supra note 170, at 303–16; Irwin Toy, [1989] 1 S.C.R at 986–96.

179

See generally BARAK, supra note 170, at 317–39.

180

Id.

181

Id.
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The next step is to ask whether the state action impairs the right as little as
possible, or in terms more familiar to American lawyers, whether there is an
alternative which would satisfy the state interest while imposing less of a burden on
the right.182 While this step sounds like the strict scrutiny test, in systems employing
proportionality it will not be interpreted as rigorously. In order for the inquiry to end
here, it must be shown an alternative exists that is obvious and practical, and that
will allow the government objective to be satisfied to the full extent that it is satisfied
by the challenged practice.183 At this stage of the analysis, the state need not accept
an alternative that would be less effective or costlier. But such matters will be
appropriate to consider in the final step of the proportionality analysis.
The final step of proportionality analysis is to weigh whether “all things
considered, the objective is sufficiently important to justify the extent of the
infringement.”184 This is the step where proportionality truly becomes a balancing
test. And, like all balancing tests, it is open to the criticism that it is hopelessly
indeterminate, and merely a matter of subjective weighing of value by the
decisionmaker. In the arena of religious freedom, do we value non-establishment
more or less than free exercise? Aharon Barak, in his survey of proportionality across
a number of legal systems, insists that a more precise balancing inquiry can at least
minimize the subjectivity problem.185 Instead of balancing at the level of the right or

182

[T]he necessity test does not require the use of means whose limitation is the
smallest, or even of a lesser extent as the means chosen by the law, if the means
cannot achieve the proper purpose to the same extent as the means chosen by
the law. This necessity test does not require a minimal limitation of this
constitutional right; it only requires the smallest limitation required to achieve
the law’s purpose.
Id. at 321.
183

See id. at 350–62.

184

Irwin Toy, [1989] 1 S.C.R at 994.

185

[T]he issue is not the comparison of the general social importance of the
purpose (security, public safety, etc.) on the one hand and the general social
importance of preventing harm to the constitutional right (equality, freedom of
expression, etc.) on the other. Rather, the issue is much more limited. It refers
to the comparison between the state of the purpose prior to the law’s
enactment, compared with that state afterwards, and the state of the
constitutional right prior to the law’s enactment compared with its state after
enactment. Accordingly, we are comparing the marginal social importance of
the benefit gained by the limiting law and the marginal social importance of
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interest involved in the abstract, the proper question is whether the marginal benefits
of the state regulation in question outweigh the marginal infringement on the right.186
This will, of course, require an assessment of the importance of the right and the
countervailing interest at the abstract level, but will not always lead to a conclusion
in favor of one or the other. Some will object to a balancing test that allows an interest
to ever prevail against a right. But in the context of religious freedom, if nonestablishment and free exercise are seen as dual aspects of the right the balance will
not, at least entirely, involve a right-interest conflict, but a balance between
potentially conflicting aspects of a single right.
How would the application of this analysis look in practice? Would it
necessarily lead to sharp changes in outcomes? Would it perhaps lead to more
convincing reasoning in support of outcomes? As an example, we might return to
Trinity Lutheran and examine it under the proportionality framework.
The threshold question is easily resolved. The Church’s complaint that the
exclusion of their application from consideration obviously presents a plausible
freedom of religion issue.187 The state then must come forward with an acceptable
objective. While the objective of the grant program is to promote safety of
playgrounds and the children who use them, the Church’s objection is not to the
program, but to the exclusion of their application. The state interest here will be itself
an argument in favor of religious freedom under the non-establishment principle.188
Given the long history of religious conflict associated with the issue of state
financial support of churches, the state should have no trouble establishing a rational
relation between its decision and its significant interest. There does not seem to be
an alternative that would address the Church’s claim yet fully satisfy the state’s

preventing the harm to the constitutional right caused by the limiting law. The
question is whether the right of the marginal social importance of the benefits
is heavier than the weight of the marginal social importance of preventing the
harm.
BARAK, supra note 170, at 351.
186

See supra notes 8–12 and accompanying text.

187

See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text.

188

Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2020–24 (2017).
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interest; the only available courses of action are to allow or deny the Church the
opportunity to participate in the program.189
With the preliminary questions addressed, and none of them leading to a quick
resolution, we come to the core of proportionality, the balancing process. Unlike
many balancing tests, this one is more “apples-to-apples” than measuring two
distinct interests.190 Both the state and the Church are pursuing their own view of
religious freedom. Is the marginal harm to the religious freedom of the Church to be
free of discrimination greater or less than the marginal harm to the non-establishment
principle that would arise from breaching the “no direct financial aid” rule?
Clearly, there will be disagreement on the proper resolution of the balancing
test. But this indeterminacy is hardly different than the current state of religion clause
jurisprudence. In fact, it is not far from the points raised by the Court’s majority
opinion in Trinity Lutheran.191 While dismissing the Establishment Clause as not at
issue, the opinion takes pains to stress it is limited to the facts presented, and also to
point out that it does not overrule, but distinguishes Locke.192 In other words, in a
situation presenting roughly similar issues, Locke and Trinity Lutheran come out
differently when the perceived burden on the non-establishment principle varies.
One significant question does remain concerning the future of Locke. And it
will need to be resolved whether or not the religion clauses are considered as separate
inquiries. Locke clearly indicated that states were free, to some extent, to strike the
non-establishment/free exercise balance more strongly in favor of nonestablishment, under their state constitutions, than the Supreme Court would do
under the First Amendment.193 Trinity Lutheran did not clearly address this point.
The Court distinguished Locke on its facts,194 but did not explain why the Missouri
State constitutional prohibition on state financial aid to churches did not protect the

189
The position that a right will always outweigh a general social interest is most closely identified with
Ronald Dworkin. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 90–94 (1978).
190
Justice Scalia is perhaps the foremost critic of balancing, contending that the attempt to balance
incommensurate interests is “like judging whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is
heavy.” Bendix Automotive Corp. v. Midwest Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
191

Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2022.

192

Id. at 2023–24; Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718–19 (2004).

193

Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2023.

194

See supra notes 45–52 and accompanying text.
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state, regardless of whether the exclusion of the church from the program ran afoul
of the First Amendment.
While the use of proportionality may not lead to a different outcome in Trinity
Lutheran, we have already seen the way in which it leads to a different outcome in
cases involving local government prayer. Town of Greece, decided under the
Establishment Clause, minimized if not completely ignored, the perspective of the
dissenting town residents.195 Instead, the focus was on whether the town crossed a
line by its actions, with no need to balance against the harm to individuals.196 Once
precedent could be invoked to support the conclusion that the prayer was acceptable,
the inquiry was over. The proportionality analysis of City of Saguenay, in contrast
took the perspective of the dissident townspeople as its starting point.197 This
perspective (also taken by Justice Kagan and the other dissenters in Town of
Greece),198 highlights the extent to which dissenters are made to feel less than full
members of the community. This point is evident in a number of Establishment
Clause cases in recent decades, most notably in Justice O’Connor’s “nonendorsement” test.199 However, it has had only sporadic success.
The proportionality test provides sufficient reasons to find fault with Town of
Greece even before considering the final balancing element of the test. The town
must initially come forward with a legitimate reason for the prayer, and presumably
that reason must be secular. Lending an air of seriousness to the proceedings might
qualify. When we reach the question of whether an obvious alternative exists that
would fully satisfy the interest while not impairing the right of religious freedom, the
town’s defense fails. Surely the Pledge of Allegiance, National Anthem, or even of
moment of silence would suffice.200
The precise scope of Town of Greece has yet to be settled. Writing for the Court,
Justice Kennedy rejected the position that either the prayers themselves, or the
process of selecting those who deliver the invocations, must be inclusive or

195

Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014).

196

See supra notes 63–74 and accompanying text.

197

See supra notes 59–62 and accompanying text.

198

See supra note 54.

199
Prior to 1999, the town’s board meetings were opened with a moment of silence. Town of Greece v.
Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1816 (2014).
200

Id. at 1820.
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ecumenical.201 He did, however, warn that there might be a limit on government
prayer if it crossed the line into either proselytizing or prayer that degrades or insults
non-believers.202 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recently faced an issue of how
seriously that restriction should be taken, and whether it was crossed by the Rowan
County, North Carolina Board of Commissioners.203
In July 2017, the Fourth Circuit issued its opinions in the en banc rehearing of
Lund v. Rowan County.204 Writing for the majority, Judge Wilkinson summarized
the case as follows:
For years on end, the elected members of the county’s Board of Commissioners
composed and delivered pointedly sectarian invocations. They rotated the prayer
opportunity amongst themselves; no one else was permitted to offer an invocation.
The prayers referenced one and only one faith and veered from time to time into
overt proselytization. Before each invocation, attendees were requested to rise and
often asked to pray with the commissioners. The prayers served to open meetings
of our most basic unit of government and directly preceded the business session
of the meeting.205

Citing a number of rather over-the-top invocations206 proclaiming the superiority of
Christianity and its specific doctrines, Judge Wilkins wrote:
We conclude that the Constitution does not allow what happened in Rowan
County. The prayer practice served to identify the government with Christianity
and risked conveying to citizens of minority faiths a message of exclusion. And
because the commissioners were the exclusive prayer-givers, Rowan County’s
invocation practice falls well outside the more inclusive, minister-oriented
practice of legislative prayer described in Town of Greece. Indeed, if elected
representatives invite their constituents to participate in prayers invoking a single

201

Id. at 1823–24.

202

Id. at 1824.

203

Lund v. Rowan County, 863 F.3d 268 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc).

204

Id. at 271–72.

205

Id. at 272; see id. at 281–82.

206

Id. at 272.
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faith for meeting upon meeting, year after year, it is difficult to imagine
constitutional limits to sectarian prayer practice.207

Still, several judges dissented, claiming Judge Wilkerson was simply cherry-picking
individual invocations to support his conclusion.208 If the Rowan County situation is
not problematic, does that mean that Town of Greece will essentially be read to mean
legislative prayer is simply per se valid? And can that possibly be correct within a
constitutional system that specifically warns against the establishment of religion?

VII. CONCLUSION: NON-ESTABLISHMENT AND FREE
EXERCISE: EITHER/OR OR NOT ONLY/BUT ALSO?
Religion clause law is in a state of flux; perhaps even in something of a state of
disarray.209 Several approaches to the Establishment Clause contend for acceptance.
While Smith seemed to simplify Free Exercise law, the legislative pushback (and
developments at the state level) have revived the Sherbert test.210 The separate
opinions in Trinity Lutheran illustrate the continued tension between the current
approaches to the two clauses.211
Perhaps much of the confusion stems from the perceived need to initially
classify a case as either a free exercise or a non-establishment problem. Having done
so, a judge may have tipped the scales in a way that ignores the extent to which the
other value is implicit in each. Canadian cases, working under a Charter of Rights
and Freedoms that does not explicitly ban establishment, illustrate the implicit
presence of each value in what American law would recognize as presenting one or
the other value.
Recognizing a single right of religious freedom, one that incorporates both nonestablishment and free exercise values, may allow for a more careful analysis of these
cases. A single proportionality test that recognizes that the claim of a free exercise
exemption or grant of aid inevitably calls for consideration of non-establishment
values, and that an Establishment Clause claim may impinge on free exercise, may
or may not change many outcomes, but will honestly confront the dual issues. Even
if American courts continue to resolve the balance as they currently do, the
application of a single test to a single right of religious freedom serves to explain the

207

Id.

208

See generally id. at 296–300 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting); id. at 301–10 (Agee, J., dissenting).

209

See supra notes 77–120 and accompanying text.

210

See supra notes 110–15 and accompanying text.

211

See supra notes 35–48 and accompanying text.
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paradox of Canadian court recognition of non-establishment values, despite the
absence of explicit non-establishment language in the Charter, even in some cases
where the U.S. Supreme Court would see no problem.
In short, religious freedom claims should not be seen as an “either/or” choice
between non-establishment and free exercise values. Regardless of how the balance
is ultimately struck, each case presents a “not only/but also” relation between the two
aspects of what is actually a single right of religious freedom.
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